

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 03176 101744Z

73

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W
----- 109262

R 101509Z MAR 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7958
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 3176

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, OREP, UR, US (SPARKMAN, JOHN)

SUBJECT: CODEL SPARKMAN: THEMES FOR BRIEFING

REF: (A) STATE 042295; (B) MOSCOW 0271

1. CODEL SPARKMAN WILL BE ARRIVING IN THE SOVIET UNION AT A TIME WHEN THE SOVIET LEADERS HAVE BECOME ACUTELY CONSCIOUS OF THE INFLUENCE CONGRESS HAS IN THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS. THE PASSAGE OF THE JACKSON AND STENENSON AMENDMENTS, AND THE SOVIETS' SUBSEQUENT POSTPONEMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE U.S.-SOVIET TRADE AGREEMENT OF 1972, HAS SHOWN THE EFFECT CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS CAN HAVE ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND, INDEED, ON DETENTE ITSELF. AT THIS POINT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS MOST CERTINLY WONDERING WHAT ROLE CONGRESS INTENDS TO PLAY IN TERMS OF THE FUTURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP AND WHAT POSITIONS INFLUENTIAL CONGRESSMEN ARE STAKING OUT FOR THEMSELVES ON IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY. THE VISIT WILL THEREFORE PROVIDE A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR THIS IMPORTANT GROUP OF SENATORS TO IMPART ITS VIEWS AND CONCERNS TO SOVIET LEADERS ON A WIDE VARIETY OF MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES.

2. AS REQUESTED REFTTEL, WE RECOMMEND THE DEPARTMENT INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN ITS BRIEFING OF THE CODEL:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 03176 101744Z

A. AS A RESULT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, THE SOVIETS ARE SUSPICIOUS AND CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT THEY REGARD AS ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. CONGRESS, WHOM THEY BELIEVE TO BE MORE ANTI-DETENTE THAN THE CONSTITUENTS THEY REPRESENT.

B. THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO TROUBLED ABOUT THE ADVERSARY RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND THE CONGRESS. CONSEQUENTLY, A MAJOR SOVIET WORRY IS THAT BECAUSE OF CONGRESS THE PRESIDENT MAY BE UNABLE TO DELIVER ON HIS COMMITMENTS TO THE SOVIET UNION. THIS DEMONSTRABLY APPLIES TO TRADE; AND THE SOVIETS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE CONCERNED THAT IT APPLIES TO SALT AND OTHER AGREEMENTS AS WELL.

C. THE CODEL SHOULD BE AWARE THAT FOREIGN TRADE FOR THE USSR (AS FOR THE U.S.) REPRESENTS ONLY A SMALL FRACTION (ABOUT -5-6 PERCENT) OF TOTAL INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY, AND THAT OVER 50 PERCENT OF TOTAL SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE IS WITH COMECON COUNTRIES. AMONG INDUSTRIALIZED WESTERN NATIONS, WEST GERMANY AND JAPAN HAVE BEEN THE USSR'S CHIEF TRADING PARTNERS IN RECENT YEARS. ADDITIONALLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE JUST GOTTEN A 950 MILLION POUND (\$2.3 BILLION) CREDIT LINE FROM GREAT BRITAIN AND A \$3 BILLION CREDIT LINE FROM IRAN. TOGETHER WITH \$2.4 BILLION IN CREDIT FROM FRANCE AND \$1.8 BILLION FROM ITALY, THESE DWARF THE \$300 MILLION SUBCEILING PROVIDED IN THE RECENT EX-IM BANK LEGISLATION. THAT MUCH OF THIS AVAILABLE FOREIGN CREDIT MAY NEVER BE DRAWN UPON IS NOT SO IMPORTANT IN SOVIET EYES AS THE FACT THAT THESE COUNTRIES TOOK THE POLITICAL DECISION TO MAKE IT AVAILABLE WHICH IS SEEN AS AN INDICATION OF THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO BUILDING TIES WITH THE USSR. THE RECENT U.S. ACTION THUS STANDS IN MARKED CONTRAST TO THAT OF OUR ALLIES IN THIS REGARD.

D. TOWARD THE ENERGY AND FOOD CRISES, THE SOVIETS HAVE SO FAR TAKEN A SOMEWHAT STANDOFFISH AND HESITANT STANCE. THEY SEEM TO PERCEIVE THAT INTERNATIONAL SHORTGES IN THESE AREAS WILL HAVE A GENERALLY ADVERSE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 03176 101744Z

EFFECT ON THE SOVIET DOMESTIC ECONOMY AND THAT THE TRADE AND FINANCIAL LINKS THEY HAVE ALREADY FORMED WITH NATIONS OUTSIDE THE COMMUNIST BLOC LIMIT THEIR FREEDOM TO EXPLOIT THESE OR OTHER CRISES FOR PURELY POLITICAL PURPOSES.

E. ON EMIGRATION, THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF TRUTH TO THE SOVIET CLAIM THAT THE DESIRE OF JEWS TO EMIGRATE

HAS FALLEN CONSIDERABLY. THE MAJOR REASONS FOR THIS APPEAR TO BE (1) CONCERN ABOUT THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN ISRAEL (AS WELL AS THE THREAT OF WAR THERE) AND IN THE WEST, WHICH HAS BEEN TRUMPETED BY SOVIET PROPAGANDISTS; (2) SELECTIVE HARASSMENT AND REFUSALS OF INDIVIDUAL APPLICANTS FOR EMIGRATION WHICH TENDS TO ENFORCE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE CHANCES OF RECEIVING PERMISSION TO LEAVE AMONG EMIGRATION-MINDED JEWS; (3) AN APPARENT SLOW-DOWN IN THE PROCESSING OF APPLICATIONS BY THE AUTHORITIES AS WELL AS REPORTED DEMANDS FOR MORE DOCUMENTATION THAN FORMERLY. THE TENDENCY ON THE PART OF POTENTIAL EMIGRANTS TO DELAY APPLICATIONS IS APPARENTLY WIDESPREAD BUT MAY NOT BE PERMANENT. ACCORDING TO LOCAL JEWISH ACTIVIST SOURCES (WHO OBVIOUSLY HAVE THEIR OWN AX TO GRIND), IF THE SITUATION WERE TO IMPROVE CONSIDERABLY IN ISRAEL AND THE WEST AND IF MEASURES OF HARASSMENT WERE LESSENED, A FLOOD OF APPLICATIONS WOULD BEGIN.

3. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR MEMBERS OF THE CODEL TO EMPHASIZE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS:

A. WHILE THE CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION DIFFER ON VARIOUS PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF DETENTE, SUPPORT FOR THE CONCEPT IN THE CONGRESS IS STRONG. THE GREAT MAJORITY OF CONGRESS IS IN FAVOR OF IMPROVING RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

B. EFFORTS TO LIMIT AND REDUCE ARMS LEVELS AND MILITARY SPENDING HAS BROAD CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT.

C. IF, HOWEVER, DETENTE IS TO BE MADE "IRREVERSIBLE," AS THE SOVIETS SAY THEY DESIRE, MOSCOW WILL HAVE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 03176 101744Z

TO UNDERSTAND THAT ALL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP WILL BE UNDER THE SCRUTINY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES. THE GREATEST POSSIBLE BLOW TO DETENTE WOULD RESULT FROM ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN SOVIET CLIENTS AND FRIENDS OR ALLIES OF THE U.S., PARTICULARLY IN CASE OF SURPRISE INVASION AS OCCURRED IN MIDDLE EAST IN OCTOBER, 1973 AND IN VIEW NAM IN APRIL, 1972. FURTHER INCIDENTS OF THIS KIND COULD DERAIL ANY CURRENT PROSPECTS OF REAL U.S.-SOVIET DETENTE.

D. FURTHERMORE, DETENTE CAN ONLY BE SUSTAINED THROUGH THE SUPPORT OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE U.S. AND THE PUBLIC IS DEEPLY CONCERNED AND INTERESTED IN THE POLICY'S HUMAN ASPECT. THEREFORE THE PUBLIC'S PERCEPTION OF SOVIET DOMESTIC POLICIES IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO THE U.S.

ABILITY TO SUPPORT A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR. LOGICALLY OR NOT, TRADE TIES ARE ESPECIALLY CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH EMIGRATION. IF THE SOVIETS ARE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN TRADE AND CREDITS WITHOUT STRINGS, THEY WILL HAVE TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE SUPPORTERS OF THIS CONCEPT IN THE SENATE TO POINT TO A RESPECTABLE SOVIET EMIGRATION FIGURE. A CONTINUED DROP IN THE NUMBERS RESULTING FROM SOVIET HARASSMENT OF POTENTIAL EMIGRANTS COULD IMPERIL ANY CHANCE FOR GETTING OUT OF THE CURRENT TRADE BIND.

E. SIMILARLY, DISTORTED TREATMENT THE UNITED STATES RECEIVES IN SOVIET MEDIA IS HIGHLY OFFENSIVE TO US AS WAS THE CASE DURING THE STRONG ANTI-U.S. PRESS CAMPAIGN WHICH FOLLOWED THE SOVIET DECISION TO REFUSE TO ACCEDE TO PROVISIONS OF TRADE ACT. SINCE CPSU CONTROLS ALL MEDIA OUTPUT, WE ARE BOUND TO REGARD TREATMENT OF U.S. IN SOVIET PRESS AS INDICATION OF GENUINE SOVIET ATTITUDES. DESCRIPTION TO SENATORS OF SOVIET CENTRAL PRESS OF JANUARY 8 (REF B) WHICH CONTAINS 20 ARTICLES CRITICAL OF U.S., WOULD BE ILLUSTRATIVE, AND PERHAPS EVEN INSTRUCTIVE, WITH REGARD TO THIS POINT.
STOESSEL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: BRIEFING MATERIALS, JACKSON-STEENENSON AMENDMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 10 MAR 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GarlanWA
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975MOSCOW03176
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750083-0912
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750366/aaaachuu.tel
Line Count: 192
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 75 STATE 042295, 75 MOSCOW 0271
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GarlanWA
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 11 JUN 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <11 JUN 2003 by izenbei0>; APPROVED <12 AUG 2003 by GarlanWA>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CODEL SPARKMAN: THEMES FOR BRIEFING
TAGS: PFOR, OREP, UR, US, (SPARKMAN, JOHN)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006